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“Normalized precarity should no longer be seen as something extraordinary,
but rather as a way of life for millions of Central Asian migrants in Russia in the
COVID-19 era.”
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T
he COVID-19 pandemic has had an immedi-
ate and unprecedented impact on the
everyday lives of Central Asian migrant
workers in Russia. But their working and living
conditions were dire well before the pandemic,
due to ever-tightening immigration rules, wide-
spread police corruption, xenophobia, and a strug-
gling economy.
In the course of our extensive fieldwork in Rus-
sia, we have observed how Russia’s economic
decline since 2014 has affected labor migration
from Central Asia, and how migrants have coped.
The pandemic has added a new array of uncertain-
ties and challenges, including deepening anti-
migrant sentiment.
Traditionally regarded as a country of emigration,
Russia has become one of the world’s main migra-
tion magnets since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It is now the fourth-largest recipient of migrants in
the world, after the United States, Germany, and
Saudi Arabia. Russia’s visa-free entry for almost all
citizens of other post-Soviet countries (except the
Baltic states, Turkmenistan, and Georgia), higher
living standards, relatively better economic oppor-
tunities, and aging population have provided fertile
ground for large-scale migratory flows from across
the former Soviet Union.
For the past two decades, labor mobility
between Central Asia and Russia has become
well established and resilient in spite of economic
crises and tightened immigration laws. But times
have been hard since Western countries imposed
sanctions on Russia following its 2014 annexation
of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Uk-
raine. Coming in the wake of a substantial deval-
uation of the ruble and a drop in the price of oil
(the country’s main source of export revenue), the
sanctions tipped Russia into a recession. For many
migrants, the situation was worsened by the gov-
ernment’s increasingly punitive measures to curb
undocumented migration.
Experts estimate the total number of migrants
in Russia at six to seven million. The majority
come from three Central Asian countries: Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2019, there
were more than two million Uzbeks, over one mil-
lion Tajiks, and about 700,000 Kyrgyz nationals in
Russia. Since Kyrgyzstan became a member of the
Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in
mid-2015, its citizens, in theory, have the same
labor rights as the local Russian population—
though Kyrgyz still face widespread violations of
those rights as well as police extortion. Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan do not belong to the bloc.
Migrant workers in Russia are mainly engaged
in low-paid jobs, doing unskilled heavy labor.
Many migrants are seasonal workers: they typi-
cally arrive in Russia in the spring, when economic
activity picks up and more jobs are available at
construction sites and on farms. They return to
their home countries in late autumn, before com-
ing back again in spring the next year.
While men typically find jobs in the construction,
transportation, and agricultural sectors, women are
predominantly employed in the retail trade (super-
markets and grocery stores, for example), catering,
and domestic and cleaning services. Men still com-
prise a large majority of migrants, but the number of
female migrants, especially from Kyrgyzstan, has
increased considerably in recent years.
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The population of Central Asian migrant work-
ers in Russia declined during the economic crisis
that began in 2014, as the cost of entry into the
official labor market increased. In 2015, the num-
bers of Uzbek and Tajik workers in Russia fell by
22.2 percent and 15.6 percent, respectively. The
number of Kyrgyz workers increased by 5.4 per-
cent over the same period, but that was likely
a result of employment restrictions easing due to
Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the EEU.
In 2013, remittances from Russia—money sent
home by migrants—totaled $7.8 billion to Uzbeki-
stan, $3.9 billion to Tajikistan, and $2.1 billion to
Kyrgyzstan. By 2015, those figures dropped by
almost half for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and by
one-third for Kyrgyzstan.
A small number of migrants who returned home
changed their preferred destinations from Russia
to alternative migration hubs such as Turkey and
Kazakhstan. (Central Asians can enter both Ka-
zakhstan and Turkey without a visa.) However,
as Russia’s economic outlook started to improve
and the Turkish and Kazakh economies experi-
enced turbulence of their own,
Central Asian migrants soon
returned to Russia, where
huge construction projects
such as building infrastructure
for soccer’s 2018 World Cup
created tens of thousands of
jobs for migrants.
The COVID-19 pandemic has once more revealed
the vulnerable position of migrants in Russia.
Thousands, if not tens of thousands, have lost their
jobs. Others have been forced to work in precari-
ous conditions, putting their health at risk.
LIVING IN THE SHADOWS
Although Central Asian migrants enter Russia
legally, they often fail to comply with immigration
laws and become undocumented. Formal rules
and requirements for residency and employment
of foreign citizens are complex and subject to con-
stant change, making it nearly impossible for
migrant workers to operate legally in the Russian
labor market. Faced with inconsistent enforce-
ment of immigration laws, many Central Asians
are compelled to find jobs in the shadow economy,
where they can get by without documents.
Alarmed by the growing undocumented migrant
labor force, Russian authorities further tightened
the laws, strengthened border infrastructure, and
introduced highly punitive enforcement provisions.
Between 2012 and 2015, more than 50 laws and
regulations aimed at reducing undocumented
migration were amended to add administrative and
criminal penalties for violations. Among these, an
outright ban on reentry for some migrants (first
introduced in 2013 and subsequently revised in
2014–15) was the most severe sanction that could
be imposed on foreign citizens who had committed
two or more administrative offenses within a three-
year period.
Another new law, known as the 90–180 rule,
took effect in January 2014, stipulating that for-
eigners can stay in Russia for only 90 days within
any 180-day period. Migrants who overstay are
subsequently banned from entering Russia for
three, five, or ten years, depending on the length
of their overstay. These restrictions made it impos-
sible for migrants to continue the common prac-
tice of crossing the border every three months in
order to reenter and start a new grace period.
An additional legislative change stripped the
Federal Migration Service of its status as an inde-
pendent government agency. It was merged into
the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in early 2016, reflect-
ing a shift toward a policing
approach to migration man-
agement. Migration officials
became de facto police offi-
cers without uniforms.
No evidence indicates that
these measures produced the desired effect. There
was a small drop in the number of migrants, but
that was more a result of Russia’s recession in the
fall of 2014 than a demonstration of the effective-
ness of harsher enforcement. In fact, the more
restrictive immigration laws and policies led to the
proliferation of ambiguous legal statuses and
illegal-document schemes. Migrants learned to
sidestep restrictions by buying “new passports”
or “clean fake” immigration papers (counterfeits
almost impossible to detect) from the numerous
“legalizing firms” operating in Russia.
As they adapted to the tighter restrictions, mi-
grants also began limiting their return trips home,
planning one long stay in Russia during which
they would try to earn as much as possible, know-
ing that they might not be allowed to reenter if
they left the country. This trend showed up in the
reduced frequency of border crossings. Many mi-
grants began overstaying in Russia, increasing the
share of undocumented foreigners in the labor
market.
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Migrants have become an
indispensable part of the
Russian labor market.
Russian authorities estimated that there were
around two million undocumented migrants in
the country by the end of 2018. Rather than reduc-
ing their numbers, the hardened legal restrictions
and punitive measures were contributing to the
growth of undocumented migration.
PATENT PENDING
One of the most important changes in the
Russian migration regime over the past five years
has been the introduction of a new work permit
system. In 2015, Russia abolished the previous
system of work permit quotas for citizens from the
visa-free post-Soviet countries and introduced new
permits, known as patents, that cover all forms of
migrant employment.
Until then, migrants could use a patent only for
entering into employment agreements with indi-
vidual citizens for personal, household, or other
similar services. Under the new system, as of Jan-
uary 1, 2015, patents became the main channel for
legal employment for all foreign workers entering
Russia under the visa-free regime.
In order to obtain a patent, migrants must meet
numerous requirements within 30 days of their
arrival. These include obtaining a migration card,
a temporary residence registration, and certificates
attesting to their health and knowledge of the Rus-
sian language and Russian history and law. They
must also pay a monthly patent fee. A migrant
needs at least 25,000 rubles (roughly $350) in
order to meet these initial requirements.
Rather than making it easier to navigate the
legalization process, the new patent system intro-
duced more complicated bureaucratic procedures
and high fees that pushed migrants further into the
shadow economy. Some resort to various semi-
legal and illegal practices, such as buying fake
documents. Given these effects, migration scholars
and experts often characterize the recent reforms
to the Russian migration regime as taking one step
forward, two steps back.
EVERYDAY XENOPHOBIA
Another challenge faced by Central Asian mi-
grants in Russia is the racism they experience in
everyday situations across all social settings,
including their interactions with government offi-
cials, police officers, and border guards.
Expressions of anti-migrant sentiment have
been normalized in contemporary Russia’s public
discourse. The prevalence of such hostility is
exemplified by the depiction of Central Asian
migrants as “illegals” or gastarbaitery (an adapta-
tion of the German word for “guest worker,”
which has been given a negative connotation in
the Russian context). These racist terms are widely
used in the Russian media as well as among ordi-
nary Russian citizens.
In everyday life in Russia, a migrant is defined as
a person who does not look Russian, regardless of
his or her legal status, citizenship, or period of res-
idence. Migrants are also assumed to be eager to
commit crimes. Such racist tropes are reinforced
by the media, shaping public opinion and intensi-
fying xenophobic attitudes toward migrants.
The coverage of Central Asian migrants before
and after the uprising in Ukraine illustrates this
typical media portrayal of migrants as public ene-
mies. Opinion polls in October 2013 showed
xenophobia against migrants in Russia at a record
high: 73 percent of respondents held the view that
the government should restrict the influx of
Central Asian migrants and expel “illegals” from
the country. Although negative attitudes toward
migrants had been common in recent years, the
increase in late 2013 was mostly a result of the
Moscow mayoral election held during the sum-
mer. Candidates competed to deliver the harshest
anti-migrant rhetoric. The campaign was widely
covered by nationwide television channels, stok-
ing anti-migrant sentiment.
But in 2014, as events in Ukraine unfolded and
tension between Russia and the West escalated,
the Russian media shifted toward anti-Ukrainian
and anti-Western rhetoric. By the summer of 2015,
the same survey that had previously recorded high
levels of xenophobia found that only 43 percent of
respondents thought that Central Asian migrants
should be barred from entering Russia. That was
a drop of 30 percentage points in two years.
However, recent opinion polls have again re-
corded rising levels of xenophobia. In September
2019, 72 percent of respondents had an unwel-
coming attitude toward migrants in Russia. The
growing anti-migrant rhetoric in the Russian
media, partly in response to the refugee crisis in
Europe in 2015–16, might explain this trend.
Along with everyday xenophobia and frequent
police abuse, migrant workers are often victims of
fraud perpetrated by employers or by intermediar-
ies who offer help with finding a job, procuring
documents, or otherwise navigating the system.
All this contributes to a constant sense of insecu-
rity that many migrants experience in their every-
day lives as they contend with the pervasive
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threats of discrimination, exploitation, abuse, and
deportation.
There is little hope of support from the Russian
government. Central Asian migrant workers are
simultaneously visible and invisible to the state. It
denies migrants access to welfare and an opportu-
nity to voice their concerns, while it exploits their
cheap labor. Migrants have become an indispens-
able part of the Russian labor market.
Migrants put up with these hardships because
their earnings in Russia are a vital source of
income for impoverished households back in their
home countries. Many migrants cling to the illu-
sion that their precarious status is temporary—
that after saving enough to buy a house or a car,
pay off debt, or celebrate a wedding, they will no
longer have to come to Russia for work. In reality,
many of them keep returning, and tolerate daily
mistreatment on the assumption that their situa-
tion is temporary and they will eventually return
home for good. They exist in a condition of nor-
malized precarity.
Nonetheless, migrants have informal resources
to draw on. Seeking to mini-
mize risks and adapt to their
precarious environment, they
come to rely on informal
safety nets and infrastructures
found within many migrant
communities. These services
have contributed to the devel-
opment of “parallel communities” in which mi-
grants can seek jobs, accommodation, leisure
activities, advice, and other assistance.
Such informal resources are especially helpful
for socializing with people from one’s home coun-
try, or even for quickly collecting money among
migrants to finance the repatriation of a deceased
countryman’s body. Informal channels and net-
works allow mobility between Russia and Central
Asia to remain resilient despite the disruptions
caused by economic crises and restrictive immi-
gration laws and policies.
POLITICAL PAWNS
As some scholars have noted, inconsistencies in
Russia’s immigration laws may be a result of the
conflicting needs and objectives of different inter-
est groups. Liberals and business elites view labor
migration as an inevitable and even necessary tool
to fill economic and demographic gaps. But siloviks
(officials from the military or security establish-
ment) and nationalists see migration as a dangerous
and undesirable phenomenon—a security and cul-
tural threat—and demand strict controls. Due to
these clashing elite views, seemingly liberal immi-
gration rules coexist with restrictive and punitive
measures.
Other scholars see these ambiguities in migra-
tion governance as serving the purpose of keeping
the number of documented migrants low so that
Russian officials can strategically manipulate anti-
migrant sentiment to gain popular support. Offi-
cials often divide immigrants into desirable and
undesirable categories based on their cultural and
racial backgrounds.
In December 2019, answering a journalist’s
question at a press conference, President Vladimir
Putin stated that Russia needs to take a selective
approach in its immigration policies. Those “who
know Russian culture and speak the language”—
in other words, people from Belarus, Ukraine, and
Moldova—are welcome, Putin declared. But he
added that it is difficult for Central Asian migrants
to adapt to Russian society. Putin called for re-
stricting migration from Central Asia to avoid
causing “irritation among
local residents when they are
faced with disrespect for our
culture and history.”
None of this should give
the impression that migrants
need Russia but Russia does
not need migrants. For
domestic political purposes, migration is depicted
as a dangerous force that must be contained and
controlled. But in fact, Russia needs migrant work-
ers not only because they provide cheap labor, but
also because they partly compensate for the coun-
try’s shrinking population. Migration also gives
Moscow leverage to influence neighboring post-
Soviet countries that are economically dependent
on the Russian labor market.
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the Russian-led
EEU, which promises free flows of capital, goods,
services, and labor among member countries, in
hopes that their migrant citizens would face fewer
bureaucratic hurdles and lower costs of entry into
the Russian labor market. This regional influence
makes the EEU one of Russia’s most important geo-
political projects in its confrontation with the West.
To take another example of the regional politics
of migration, when the Russian military’s lease of
a base in Tajikistan was about to expire in 2012,
one of the concessions that Moscow was willing to
grant in exchange for a 30-year extension of the
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Central Asian migrants are
forced to find jobs in the
shadow economy.
was an amnesty for “illegal” Tajik migrants. The
two governments also struck an agreement
on easing travel and work restrictions for Tajik
nationals in Russia.
Russia has also routinely used citizenship as
a means of gaining leverage in regional geopolitics.
One of the justifications cited by Moscow for its
involvement in territorial conflicts with Moldova,
Georgia, and Ukraine has been the large number of
people in disputed regions of those countries—
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea,
Donetsk, and Luhansk—who had received Rus-
sian citizenship well before the fighting broke out.
Putin has claimed a duty to protect ethnic Russians
and Russian speakers outside the motherland. But
the distribution of Russian passports to residents
of these areas has often coincided with an intensi-
fication of conflict.
Citizenship is not just a geopolitical tool for
Moscow. Population aging and a shrinking labor
force have been a top concern for Russian author-
ities. In the past three decades, the population
shrank by 3.6 million despite the inflow of
Russian speakers from other post-Soviet countries
in the 1990s and the naturalization of several mil-
lion new citizens in recent years.
Russia has been easing naturalization rules for
more than a decade. In 2018, nearly 270,000 for-
eigners obtained Russian citizenship. In 2019, the
number jumped to almost 500,000. Approximately
300,000 of these new citizens are former Ukrainians;
167,000 of the new passports were issued in Russia’s
Rostov region, which borders separatist-held areas
in eastern Ukraine.
In April 2020, Russia adopted a new law that
simplifies the rules for obtaining Russian citizen-
ship. Among other changes, it allows naturalized
citizens to retain their original nationality. The
previous requirement that applicants give up
their citizenship in their home countries deterred
many who had resided in Russia for a long period
from applying. This kept tens of thousands of
migrants with residence permits in limbo, allow-
ing them to continue living and working in Russia
but with no viable path to citizenship unless they
were willing to cut ties with their home countries
(some of which, such as Uzbekistan, prohibit dual
citizenship).
Obtaining Russian citizenship lowers the cost of
entry into the labor market and provides more
secure status. The economic crisis caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic will likely increase competi-
tion for jobs (including with local Russians),
which in turn will encourage more migrants who
have lived in Russia for several years to apply for
Russian citizenship.
PANDEMIC SHOCK
The pandemic caught migrant workers in
Russia by surprise. As the number of confirmed
cases started to soar, the government imposed
lockdown measures to contain the virus. On
March 18, Russia barred entry for all foreigners,
a restriction that remained in place through the
spring and into the summer.
Regional authorities were given autonomy to
decide how far to go in ordering temporary clo-
sures. Since lockdown policies differed from
region to region, the scale of job losses among
migrants also varied.
In Moscow, the leading destination for mi-
grants, fairly strict lockdown measures were
imposed. As many businesses suspended their
activities, especially in the service and retail trade
sectors, Central Asian migrants were first in line to
lose their jobs. Although authorities urged compa-
nies not to fire staff during the crisis, few busi-
nesses could afford to retain their Russian
employees, let alone migrant workers. Tax holi-
days and incentives offered by the government did
little to alleviate most firms’ losses. At best, mi-
grants were put on unpaid leave without any guar-
antee of returning to the same job.
According to Russian immigration rules, mi-
grants must work in the jurisdiction where they
obtain their work permits. A migrant who loses a job
in Moscow and finds another in a different province
has to start over with the process of applying for
a new patent. This rule was especially problematic
during the lockdown. Many jobless migrants were
stuck indoors in large cities like Moscow and
St. Petersburg at a time when there was a growing
demand for labor in southern regions as spring
arrived and the season for agricultural work began.
Job losses among migrants also differed by sec-
tor. While most migrants who had been employed
in the service and trade sectors had to stay indoors
without jobs, construction laborers were allowed to
return to work after just a few weeks of confine-
ment. This was partly due to concerns expressed by
big businesses over a potential shortage of cheap
labor and the suspension of construction projects.
However, the main reason for allowing migrants
to return to construction sites was probably the
mid-April detection of coronavirus infections at
a dormitory housing about 470 migrants outside
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St. Petersburg. The number of confirmed infec-
tions at the dorm eventually reached 123. Similar
mass outbreaks among migrants also occurred in
dormitories in the regions of Murmansk, where
125 were infected, and Bashkortostan, where 68
tested positive. Authorities likely realized that
locking down large numbers of migrants might
lead to more outbreaks.
Putin urged provincial governors to let migrants
return to construction sites. On April 18, he signed
a decree allowing migrants to work without per-
mits from March 15 to June 15. Their stays in
Russia would be automatically prolonged without
the risk of fines or deportation.
Even so, migrants have become one of the most
vulnerable social groups in Russia during the pan-
demic. Many have lost their jobs, while others have
been compelled to work on construction sites and in
housecleaning and other domestic services, risking
their health. If they test positive for COVID-19, mi-
grants have minimal access to health care services.
Central Asian governments organized several
charter flights to repatriate their most vulnerable
citizens, but tens of thousands were still waiting to
return home. Charities and
local activists delivered food
to those who lost their jobs
and were confined inside
without any means to feed
themselves. Most migrants
send almost all of their earn-
ings home to their families,
keeping only enough to cover their own basic sub-
sistence costs. Many of them soon ran out of
money during the lockdown.
Migrants who kept their jobs and had to com-
mute amid the lockdown were often stopped by
police, who checked their identification and travel
permits. Migrant rights activists have reported that
even when migrants produced all their documents,
police officers often accused them of breaching the
lockdown rules. In most cases, they were released
after paying a bribe.
The collapse of oil prices just before the lock-
down measures took effect worsened Russia’s eco-
nomic crisis. Many Russians have lost their jobs,
accelerating a long-term decline in living stan-
dards. As the unemployment rate increased
sharply, Russian authorities started to adopt new
rules to ensure that the local population would
have priority for employment in skilled jobs.
When competition for scarce jobs intensifies,
populists may step up their efforts to stir up
xenophobia among the public. Some Russian
media outlets have depicted migrants as so desper-
ate to find food that they are prepared to do any-
thing, even resort to crime.
Job losses and reduced earnings among mi-
grants have already resulted in a decline in the re-
mittances they send to their home countries. Central
Asian economies have suffered from national lock-
down measures and the closure of nonessential busi-
nesses. Dwindling intakes of remittances and the
weakening of the Russian economy—one of the larg-
est trade partners for Central Asian countries—
threaten to cause more severe damage.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the poorest coun-
tries in the region, will suffer the most. In 2018,
migrant remittances amounted to 33 percent of
gross domestic product in Kyrgyzstan and 29 per-
cent in Tajikistan. More than $8 billion in remit-
tances was sent to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan in 2019. In June 2020, reports indi-
cated that remittances to Central Asian countries
in March and April fell by nearly half from the
same period the previous year.
Seasonal migrants across Central Asia now find
themselves in a difficult situa-
tion. They cannot find jobs at
home, and they cannot travel
to Russia because the borders
remain closed. Even if the bor-
ders open in the coming
months, it will be hard to find
jobs in Russia. The labor mar-
ket is expected to stay shrunken for an extended
period after the pandemic.
Unlike the Russian economic crises of 2008–9
and 2014–15, when the number of migrants fell
sharply but gradually recovered over the next sev-
eral years, it will take longer for the situation to
normalize after the pandemic. The calamity over-
took Russia at a time when its economy was
already shrinking. Oil prices and the ruble have
plummeted; supply and demand chains have rup-
tured. Amid these economic blows, Russian soci-
ety faces deepening political repression.
In the short term, as employers try to minimize
their costs by hiring employees unofficially to
avoid taxes, more and more migrants will be
pushed into the shadow economy, increasing the
risks of exploitation and deportation. Normalized
precarity should no longer be seen as something
extraordinary, but rather as a way of life for mil-
lions of Central Asian migrants in Russia in the
COVID-19 era. &
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Punitive measures contributed to
the growth of undocumented
migration.
